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Abstract 
This working paper creates a theoretical framework to explain how 
Global Wealth Chains are created, maintained, and governed. We draw 
upon different strands of literature, including scholarship in 
international political economy and economic geography on Global 
Value Chains, literature on finance and law in institutional economics, 
and work from economic sociology on network dynamics within 
markets. This scholarship assists us in highlighting three variables in 
how Global Wealth Chains are articulated and change according to: (1) 
the complexity of transactions, (2) regulatory liability and (3) 
innovation capacities among suppliers of products used in wealth 
chains. We then differentiate five types of global value chain 
governance - market, modular, relational, captive, and hierarchy - 
which range from simple ‘off shelf’ products shielded from regulators 
by advantageous international tax laws to highly complex and flexible 
innovative financial products produced by large financial institutions 
and corporations. This paper highlights how Global Wealth Chains 
intersect with value chains and real economies, and provides three 
brief case studies on offshore shell companies, family property trusts, 
and global-scale corporate tax avoidance. 
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 Introduction 
The last decades have witnessed a proliferation of global value chains 
as industrial capabilities have spread to the developing world and firms 
have re-organized accordingly, disaggregating and allocating activities 
across jurisdictions to maximize competitive advantage and market 
position. Indeed, some commentators have gone as far as to suggest 
that we are witnessing the era of the post-national or decentred 
multinational corporation (Desai 2008). In these terms, the 
multinational company (MNC) has transcended a dominant national 
imaginary of economic life. Paralleling these developments has been 
the increasing size, mobility and fluidity of finance. Not only have 
financial markets grown so that the total value of financial assets now 
far outweighs global GDP, but  the capacity of actors to shift asset, 
costs, profits and liabilities across borders has increased exponentially. 
One result of these, for us integrated, processes is a notable disjuncture 
between territorially fixed fiscal and intrinsically mobile financial 
systems. The mobility of capital and its ability to switch asset identity 
and jurisdictional home has raised the spectre of a permanent schism 
between the location of value creation and the geographical allocation 
of profits and wealth. These processes unfold through a variety of 
network forms ranging from market interactions supplying off the shelf 
tax products for the individual consumer to highly complex financial 
structures produced on a bespoke basis for large financial and non-
financial firms. The purpose of this paper is to generate a theoretical 
framework for better understanding the governance and articulation of 
what we call ‘global wealth chains’. Global Wealth Chains (GWCs) are 
defined as transacted forms of capital operating multi-jurisdictionally 
for the purposes of pecuniary wealth creation and protection. We seek 
to provide the most simple means of delineating forms of GWC to 
enable scholars and policy makers alike to understand their role in the 
changing nature of modern capitalism. 
The impacts emanating from the operation and evolution of GWCs 
are pervasive, not only effecting the competitive position of firms 
within industries and specific value chains, but circumscribing the 
distribution of wealth arising from increasingly globalized economic 
activities (Seabrooke and Wigan 2014). The capacity to utilize wealth 
chains will directly impact opportunities for country level development 
and who bears the fiscal burden across and within both developed and 
developing countries. For International Political Economy wealth 
chains refract on-going challenges to extant conceptions of relations 
between states and markets and force us to confront the specificity of 
contemporary globalizing capital itself. Our hope is that by providing a 
means of categorizing and specifying  global wealth chains this 
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research can also feed into urgent unilateral and multilateral policy 
efforts to ameliorate the disjuncture between value creation and 
allocation and the on-going project of value chain research to identify 
obstacles to, and opportunities for upgrading, learning and 
development within the contemporary world economy. 
 Specialize, Diversify, Network 
We draw on three strands of literature, including scholarship in 
international political economy and economic geography on Global 
Value Chains, literature on finance and law in institutional economics, 
and work from economic sociology on network dynamics within 
markets, product selection and the status of those engaged in these 
markets. Our argument here is that the work on value chains is useful 
in identifying processes in market, that the work on finance and law 
highlights incentives to maximize profit, and that economic sociology 
tells us how actors select particular products and shift between them.  
We use these three strands of literature to identify: 
i)  Power asymmetries and related degrees of transaction complexity 
between suppliers and clients; 
ii)  incentives for innovation in finance and law through institutional 
forms, including the drive to specialize & diversify; 
iii)  the reasons why markets segment according to the status of the 
client and supplier, and what relationships reinforce wealth chains 
in particular ways. 
The literature on global value chains and how they are governed began 
on the premise that production across the globe is increasingly 
fragmented. As trade became more integrated, production became 
more disintegrated with the rise of component manufacturing and 
modularity. Fragmentation in production networks spurred demand for 
explaining the various processes through which production was 
coordinated, the cost of transactions between particular suppliers and 
buyers, and, most of all, asset specificity - the capacity to replicate 
particular assets at low cost or protect them through premium added 
value (Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon 2005). The global value chains 
literature drew on transaction cost economics to explain why some 
processes are not outsourced but kept in-house to reduce cost and 
retain competitive advantages. The argument proceeds in telling us 
that information asymmetries between different levels of the chain - 
characterized (as here) as ‘market’, ‘modular’, ‘relational’, ‘captive’, 
and ‘hierarchy’ - are important in determining the potential for genuine 
economic development, fostering human capital, and reducing trade 
barriers. This pro-development agenda has been taken up by a number 
of international economic organizations, with the World Bank, OECD, 
and others all promoting the notion of global value chains. The WTO, in 
particular, has placed the analysis of global value chains at the centre 
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of its research strategy, calling for policymakers and scholars to 
identify production processes and their relationship to trade to reduce 
information asymmetries and encourage growth and development. This 
burgeoning interest in the distributional consequences of globalization 
has only been extenuated under current conditions of heightened 
concern over rising and persistent inequality. 
We suggest that what we call wealth chains are the yin to the yang 
of value chains. While actors in value chains share an interest in 
transparency and coordination, those in wealth chains thrive on 
rendering movements through the chain opaque. Wealth chains hide, 
obscure and relocate wealth to the extent that they break loose from the 
location of value creation and heighten inequality. Research on value 
chains has provided important tools for locating value creation, 
allocation and capture, producing thick descriptions on how value 
chains work in practice that are nested in typologies of governance and 
transaction complexity and codification (Gereffi et al. 2005, Ponte and 
Sturgeon 2014). While the literature on value chains provides a 
number of important insights and has had a significant impact on 
transnational policy development, it has been largely silent on the link 
between value chains and financial and legal innovations created by 
firms, lawyers and investors (with some notable exceptions, see 
Williams 2000; Milberg 2008). Of course scholars of value chains have 
a different empirical focus, but our claim here is that value chains must 
be understood alongside wealth chains. The rationale for doing so is 
straightforward: understanding the dynamics behind Multinational 
Corporations’ (MNCs) global strategies and the geography of offshore 
finance, and, in turn, the opportunities and constraints these may 
generate in developed and developing countries, is incomplete if the 
legal and financial aspects which condition these dynamics and 
opportunities are neglected. 
Furthermore, the early promises of value chains are being 
confronted by empirical developments. Value chain research has been 
premised on the disaggregation of production processes across space. 
We suggest that in the era of the ‘decentred corporation’ (Desai 2008) 
research should incorporate the legal and financial disaggregation of 
the firm. As capital itself finds increasingly abstract expression in the 
form of intellectual property and financial innovations our imaginaries 
of the corporation and its operations requires some revisiting. It is 
already apparent that the contemporary MNC has transcended the 
institutional complex of the Fordist era. It also seems the the MNC is 
now risk managed as an integrated productive and financial entity. 
However, our analytical tools for capturing these developments have 
not kept up. What we need is a better understanding of how financial 
and legal innovations are articulated through wealth chains in ways 
that harm value chains and development objectives. We also need to 
understand how wealth chains are maintained through professional 
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and social networks (Harrington 2012), including how they are 
grounded.  
Studies of finance and law provide an immediate insight into the 
intellectual sources of those providing global wealth chains. There is a 
general silence on the offshore world in economics, including within 
this literature, which stays firmly within the boundaries of established 
national and international law rather than the grey zones frequently 
seen in the offshore world. Conventional theories of finance focus on 
deposit-taking institutions, equities trading and price formation, often 
with an emphasis on the welfare enhancing and market completing 
functions provided by new financial innovations (Allen and Santomero 
1997) and a commitment to the assertion that financial development is 
a positive determinant of growth (Allen and Gale 1994). Economists 
interested in institutions have criticized the neo-classical perspective 
for only dealing with functions as opposed to institutions, claiming that 
this narrow perspective distorts analysis of how change in markets 
really occurs (a review of disputes over innovation in economics vs. 
financial economics can be found in Engelen et al. 2008). For example, 
insurance to protect against loss in the value of asset could be provided 
in an options market, but also by an insurance firm. While the function 
of asset protection is equivalent in both choices, the institutional 
arrangements underpinning this activity differ (Merton 1995: 467). In 
effect financial innovation has blurred prior boundaries between 
institutions and assets as the key product of innovation has been the 
capacity to replicate assets and exposures synthetically. This has 
transformed the fluidity and mobility of finance and in so doing the 
capacities and character of ownership (Bryan and Rafferty 2006). 
Innovations permit rapid and, relatively, frictionless switching. In 
consequence an exposure to an asset or an ownership position can be 
transformed in terms of character, term and ‘geopolitical locations’  
(Merton 1995: 463-4). Finnerty (1988: 18) famously proposed three 
criteria for financial innovation; innovation must reduce or reallocate 
risk to reduce the required offering yield (cost of credit), lower issuance 
expenses (cost of financial production), or create a tax arbitrage 
opportunity (cost of political geography). Recent accelerated 
innovation in finance then has served to widen what is perceived as a 
disjuncture between the mobile and the fixed; here, in the form of the 
fiscal apparatus of the state.  
Importantly for the study of wealth chains, the logical consequence 
of argument from those considering the relationship between finance, 
law and institutions is rapidly evolving forms of institutional 
differentiation to provide similar functions to different clients, 
including geopolitical ‘relocation’ to institutional conditions that 
maximize efficiencies. So while the more institutionalist literature does 
not address the offshore world, it provides pointers to the relationship 
between functional and institutional differentiation. As such, it holds 
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keys to understanding the supply of wealth chains and the incentives 
suppliers have to differentiate themselves in the marketplace. 
The old institutional political economy of John Commons and 
Thorstein Veblen provides an entrance point in understanding the 
mutually constitutive role of finance and law in GWCs. In asserting the 
‘legal foundations of capitalism’ Commons built on the earlier work of 
Veblen in outlining a theory of value based on the habits and customs 
of social life. Commons elaborated his conception of ‘reasonable value’ 
on the basis of the formation of the large US trusts at the end of the 
19th century (1924: 1-65; 1934: 649-875). Drawing from hearings 
before the United States Industrial Commission, he argued that the 
value of an entity is neither a function of its physical property, its’ 
corporeal property, or its incorporeal property, or debts due. Business 
valuation rested instead largely upon ‘intangible property’. Andrew 
Carnegie’s corporeal property in his omnipotent steel business was 
valued at US$ 75 million, but he was paid US$300 million by the 
holding company. Further, while the corporeal property of the 
combination had been estimated to be worth US$ 1 billion its ultimate 
valuation stood at US$ 2 billion. The legally determined excess, above 
historic cost, can only be imputed to the owners control over the 
industry, or, in the first instance, to ‘Carnegie’s threatening position in 
the market’ (Commons 1934: 649-650). Both are disingenuously 
named ‘goodwill’. The important point here is that reasonable value 
had its foundations in law and the differential advantages and 
constraints law imposed. Value, rather than a direct corollary of the 
production process or of prices spontaneously emerging on a hedonic 
gauge, was a function of machinations in the sphere of law and 
finance3. 
For Commons every economic transaction occurs simultaneously in 
two spheres. One is the sphere of goods and labour articulated in a 
production process. The other is the sphere of law as every exchange is 
simultaneously an exchange of a property title. The holder of a 
property title does so on the basis of attachment to a sovereign space. 
Every company must be incorporated in law and every contract must, 
by definition, be located in a sovereign space. ‘Reasonable value’ then, 
or the legally sanctioned attribution of worth, is generated by the 
interaction between the activity, the title and the sovereign. Work 
within International Political Economy on what is now widely termed 
the ‘offshore world’ (Palan 2003) has emphasized the constitutive 
significance of bifurcated sovereignty. States bifurcate law so that one 
sets of rules applies to a domestic sphere and another to a virtual 
                                                          
3  Veblen’s analysis of absentee ownership is a case in point. He argued that the 
dilution of liability associated with the ownership of public equity privileged 
‘absentee’ (we might think abstracted) owners in capturing wealth from corporate 
competition. In this perspective finance is and must be firstly a legal category. 
Financial assets are incorporeal and integrative of the future. As such, as 
commodities they are a function of law. 
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sphere, or, more prosaically, to internationally mobile people, titles 
and assets. The bifurcation of the transaction and the bifurcation of 
sovereignty are inextricably entwined. This is this institutional basis of 
the concept of wealth chains. Wealth chains flourish precisely because 
of capital’s dual spheres and how this bifurcation enables capital to 
effectively arbitrage and valorize sovereign bifurcation. 
We also suggest that scholarship in economic sociology and what is 
known as ‘social studies of finance’ is important for explaining how 
global wealth chains are articulated and governed.4 This is particularly 
the case for understanding what types of information are important for 
clients and suppliers in wealth chains and how types of information 
reflect different relationships.  As with value chain analysis and work 
on financial innovation, economy sociology literature has not really 
engaged the offshore world, but contains important lessons if we are to 
construct an analytical toolkit for investigating global wealth chains. 
One key reason why the offshore world has been overlooked in this 
literature (for example, the showcase collected volume in this field, 
Knorr Cetina and Preda 2005, mentions offshore only once) is that 
many of these studies are situated in the trading room or ‘nerve centers’ 
in financial institutions. MacKenzie’s (2006) work, for example, has 
demonstrated how, when enacted, financial models act as ‘engines’ 
rather than ‘cameras’ in shaping rather than reflecting markets. Those 
applying particular financial theorems then engage in ‘performativity’ 
that directs markets in particular ways, heightening uncertainties while 
those doing the work are too blinded by faith to recognize them (ibid. 
2011). Others have recently discussed the performativity in 
international microfinance markets (Henriksen 2013) and credit rating 
agencies (Paudyn 2012). There has also been a focus on global or 
transnational ‘microstructures’ that create convergence on how 
particular assets, products, and identities are viewed in European and 
American financial markets (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger 2002). Such 
work has also investigated the complex forms of communication and 
coordination between arbitrage traders who are locating opportunities 
from their desks in Manhattan investment banks (Stark 2009). For 
obvious reasons of secrecy, access to the inner dealings of suppliers 
operating in offshore jurisdictions have been harder to accomplish. 
Still, this work provides important insights into why there is 
convergence on the provision of certain products for wealth chains. 
                                                          
4  A different but related literature is that on ‘financialization’, which focuses on 
providing critical assessments of processes that encourage the individuation of 
responsibility for finance, including shareholder value, direct contributions in 
pension schemes, and housing finance. See Zwan 2014 for an excellent review of 
this literature. We agree with Simone Pollilo’s (2013) argument that financialization 
as a concept is good at explaining processes but often misses conflicts between 
groups.  
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Scholarship in economic sociology has a lot of important lessons for 
the analysis of wealth chains when it comes to explaining the role of 
client perception, client and supplier status, and the structure of the 
market more generally. For example, the notion of structural 
equivalence in markets suggests that suppliers do not perceive demand 
independently but act in interdependent relationships where they 
perceive how other suppliers are pricing themselves (White 1976, 
White 2002). Research on entrepreneurship within networks has 
demonstrated that information sharing is more rapid in sectors that are 
transnational and less likely to be ‘Balkanized’, with a clear difference 
between transatlantic investment banking and US domestic supply-
chain management (Burt 2010: 72-79). In such networks those who 
can demonstrate high status and behave aggressively tend to do better, 
as do those who are able to engage in ‘epistemic arbitrage’ in exploiting 
differences in knowledge between professional groups (Seabrooke 
2014).   
Work on status signals in markets has demonstrated that 
information asymmetries are important in both egocentric and 
altercentric forms (Podolny 2005). Egocentric uncertainty is about an 
actor’s capacity to provide services or products of a certain quality, 
while altercentric uncertainty about the capacities of others. High 
altercentric uncertainty increases the high-status value of products, 
while high egocentric uncertainty undermines it (Podolny 2005: 227-
9). Similarly, Phillips and Zuckerman (2001) provide solid grounds for 
why financial markets are differentiated not only from a capacity for 
innovation but from the capacities of clients to recognize differences in 
what the supplier is providing. Those who are not aware of in-product 
differences, or who are not attractive to suppliers, will tend to choose 
the most market conforming products available. Products that are 
considered to be extreme will be avoided for fear of being spotted by 
regulators, while middle of the road products will be identified as safe 
and less likely to come under international regulatory scrutiny. This 
scholarship is also helpful in identifying types of information, with 
information that has a high ‘homophilic’ value prized more than that 
from sources which are distant and unknown. This includes not only 
the source of the information but shared vocabularies, practices and 
assumptions about how markets operate (Reagan and Zuckerman 
2008). Such homophilic information is particularly important among 
trust networks, including some of the forms of wealth chains we 
describe below. 
As recognized in IPE scholarship, it is not only access to information 
that counts, but understanding what the information means that 
provides the key problem for governance (de Goede 2001). Uncertainty 
may not only present a problem for governance but a resource for those 
who seek to avoid governance (Seabrooke 2007; Wigan 2008). There 
are a number of ways to examine how information is treated, including 
interviews with practitioners and policymakers, participant 
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observation in trade fairs and training, and, recently, experimental 
methods that provide hard evidence on how suppliers positively 
respond to information requests that infringe national and 
international financial regulations (Findley, Nielson and Sharman 
2013). We embrace all of these as means to investigate information 
asymmetries in wealth chains. 
 
 Types of Governance in Global 
Wealth Chains 
What we term global wealth chains has been studied under the rubric 
of the ‘offshore world’ within International Political Economy (Palan 
2003). This broad literature has provided insight into the structural 
and institutional determinants of GWCs, prolonged regulatory 
processes surrounding their evolution, the size and impact of capital’s 
movement through offshore spaces and a rich tapestry of case studies 
which shed light on aspects of GWCs (Hudson 1998). Myriad 
components of and practices within GWCs have been examined. Areas 
as diverse as money laundering, financial intermediation, tax 
avoidance, tax evasion, transfer pricing, intellectual property 
management and multilateral and unilateral policy development have 
come under scrutiny. The topic has also proven a fertile bed for 
theoretical testing and development.  
The contribution of the concept of GWCs is premised in part on the 
argument that while conceptualizing the practices and relationships we 
explore as constitutive of an offshore world has been helpful in 
emphasizing the bifurcation of sovereignty, it deflects attention to the 
pervasive and systemic presence of GWCs. The cartographic imaginary 
of ‘offshore-onshore’ alludes to a spatial demarcation that is not 
tenable. Further, a means of categorization and a framework through 
which to identify category determinants provides common ground on 
which disparate research can meet. We suggest the concept of GWCs 
can contribute to a comprehensive picture of the offshore ecology, the 
identification of the drivers of niche formation within that ecology and 
patterns of cooperation, conflict and dependence, which define its 
evolution. While we have an increasingly detailed picture of the 
offshore world we are yet to have the tools to identify patterns of the 
relationships that both circumscribe its manifestations and define its 
use and development.   
Work on structural determinants has focused on the offshore world 
as a means of reconciling the contradictions between a world market 
and system of states (Palan 2003), international tax competition as a 
corollary to the rational maximizing behavior of competitive states 
(Rixen 2008) or offshore finance as a vehicle for the expression of 
capital’s specificity and internationalization (Coates and Rafferty 
2007). These divergent analyses draw our attention to system level 
implications. Institutional explanations elaborate origins in 
sovereignty, law, accounting and international business taxation. Here 
the implications of the state as ‘legal fiction’ (Picciotto 1999) and 
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practices of bifurcating and commercializing sovereignty are explored 
(Palan 2003). The role of accounting technologies and the relationship 
between the accounting profession, the globalization of capital and the 
state is another key component here (Sikka and Wilmott 2010). This 
work demonstrates the centrality of accounting standards and 
pinpoints some of the professionals active in the production of 
offshore, most notably in nominating the large accounting firms as an 
effective ‘pinstripe mafia’ (Mitchell and Sikka 2011). Picciotto (1992), 
from a legal perspective has provided perhaps the most comprehensive 
historical analysis of the interaction of international business with the 
myriad national legal and fiscal systems, which constitute the grounds 
upon which corporate tax abuse is executed. Both structural and 
institutional analyses have been important in highlighting system level 
prerequisites for the operation and proliferation of GWCs. They 
therefore provide a key resource in laying the groundwork for more 
fine-grained analyses. 
A second stream of literature has since the OECD’s 1996 launch of 
its harmful tax competition initiative investigated regulatory processes 
and the determinants of their results. Where the structural analyses 
noted above have highlighted origins in mutually exclusive and 
competing territorially bound sovereignty this literature emphasizes 
the constraints placed on regulatory traction by the competing interests 
of states, particularly those of micro-states, the OECD and OECD 
members (Ecclestone 2013; Rawlings 2007; Sharman 2006). For 
instance, that Europe’s members include some of the largest offshore 
provider states means European policy traction faces considerable 
obstacles (Wigan 2014). Recent work on anti-money laundering 
policies has discussed power asymmetries in the determination of anti-
money laundering policies and how they are often poorly targeted and 
provide administrative costs to developing countries that cannot afford 
them (Jakobi 2013; Sharman 2011; Tsingou 2010). Novel natural 
experiment methodologies have been deployed to gauge provider 
compliance and reveal the central role of providers in many OECD 
countries (Sharman 2011; Findley, Nielson and Sharman 2013). Work 
on the regulation of terrorist financing has highlighted mechanisms 
driving the securitization of money and the constitutive role of risk in 
regulatory design and social stratification and exclusion (de Goede 
2005; Vlcek 2008). New research on how family trusts and wealth 
managers operate has peeped into the complex trust networks behind 
trustee and estate management (Rawlings 2011; Harrington 2012). 
This is not an exhaustive examination of the ‘offshore’ literature and 
much more has been done by activist scholars seeking to expose how 
wealth chains are articulated, including the renaming of ‘offshore’ to 
secrecy jurisdictions’ to highlight that they are present in the heart of 
the OECD and expose their real function (Murphy 2012, Leaman and 
Waris 2013, Henry 2012). 
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We suggest that the literature on the ‘offshore world’ can be 
combined with the insights noted in the previous section on global 
value chains, finance and law, and economic sociology to propose a 
typology of global wealth chains. In creating this typology we draw 
directly from the well established typology on global value chains 
provided by Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon. The value chains 
typology is built on the notion that between markets between firms and 
hierarchies within firms there are also network relationships they 
characterize as modular, relational, and captive (Gereffi, Humphrey 
and Sturgeon 2005: 83-4). The five basic types of value chain 
governance are Markets, Modular, Relational, Captive, and Hierarchy. 
Market value chains refers to when information is easily communicated 
and transactions are governed with little explicit coordination. Modular 
value chains occur from the provision of products to a customer’s 
specification but with generic machinery. Relational value chains there 
are complex interactions and high levels of specificity in what is being 
supplied. Captive value chains refers to when small suppliers rely on 
larger suppliers. Hierarchical value chains are vertically integrated 
with high levels of managerial control. These types of value chain 
governance provide the framework for this now substantial body of 
literature, including the active interest from policymakers in applying it 
to the international trading regime, as well as using it to inform 
discussions about corporate social responsibility.   
We adapt these five types of governing value chains to our interest 
on global wealth chains. Our types of governance for global wealth 
chains are analytical types. As with all ideal types they are constructed 
for the purpose of learning and should be broken down and 
reconstructed where appropriate. Our five types are not silos but can 
interact with each other in articulating global wealth chains. The types 
of governance in global wealth chains are: 
1. Market linkages occur through arms length relationships with low 
complexity in established legal regimes. Products can be accessed 
from multiple suppliers who compete on price and capacity. 
 2.  Modular wealth chains offer more bespoke services and products 
within well-established financial and legal environments that 
restrict the supplier and client flexibility. Products involve complex 
information but can be exchanged with little explicit coordination. 
Bespoke suppliers are commonly associated with a lead supplier. 
3.  Relational wealth chains involve the exchange of complex tacit 
information, requiring high levels of explicit coordination. Strong 
trust relationships managed by prestige and status interactions 
make switching costs high. 
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4.  Captive wealth chains occur when lead suppliers dominate smaller 
suppliers by dominating the legal apparatus and financial 
technology. Clients’ options are limited by the scope of what can be 
provided by small suppliers and, in turn, lead suppliers. 
5.  Hierarchy wealth chains are vertically integrated. A high degree of 
control is exercised by senior management, such as a Chief 
Financial Officer. Clients and suppliers are highly integrated and 
coordinate on complex transactions.   
Figure 1, below, illustrates these five types following the definition of 
the different types of wealth chains given above. The figure identifies 
the lead suppliers of financial products and services, the secondary 
suppliers (be they bespoke relational or simply smaller), the clients and 
the basic relationships in the transfer of capital from its source to 
facilitate wealth creation and eventually return to the client. We also 
note that flow of capital from the source through wealth creation 
mechanisms and back again, as well as that coordination in these 
different forms of governance becomes more complex and explicit as 
we move from the left to the right of the diagram. 
 Figure 1 Five global wealth chain governance types 
 
 
 
 A Theory of Global Wealth Chain 
Governance 
Our typology on the governance of global wealth chains draws on 
insights from the work on global value chains, from studies of the 
relationship between finance and law, and from scholarship in 
economic sociology on relational dynamics and network characteristics 
in financial markets. We argue that while this literature has largely 
ignored the offshore world, it assists us in creating a typology of wealth 
chains by pointing out the relationship between functions and 
institutions, incentives for specialization and diversification, and the 
role of information asymmetries within networks, including 
perceptions of status and prestige that shape these asymmetries. 
Combined these insights allow us to distinguish reasons why what has 
been understood as the offshore world can be understood as different 
types of governance over global wealth chains, identifying the market, 
modular, relational, captive, and hierarchy types discussed above.   
Our conception of global wealth chains shares many similarities 
with Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon’s (2005) typology, but also 
contains important differences. These authors provide a theory of value 
chain governance that is premised on three factors: the complexity of 
information to sustain transactions; the ability to codify transactions, 
and the capabilities of potential suppliers to meet the requirements of 
the transaction (Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon 2005: 85). These 
three factors are appropriate for value chains because they concentrate 
on identifying transaction complexity, efficiency and capacity. 
However, an important problem here when applying this thinking to 
global wealth chain is much of the activity is explicitly intended to 
avoid codification to third parties. Given this a focus on codification, as 
means of distinguishing wealth chains, is less effective than a focus on 
regulatory density. Furthermore, capabilities for those supplying 
products and services is less about the capacity to meet the 
requirements of the transaction and more about capabilities to mitigate 
challenges and cope with uncertainty about the status of the 
transaction. These considerations lead to the following factors in a 
theory of wealth chain governance: 
A)  The complexity of information and knowledge transfer with regard 
to the product or service being provided by the supplier to meet the 
client’s requirements; 
B) the regulatory liability involved in transactions and the ease of 
multi-jurisdictional regulatory intervention; 
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C)  the capabilities of suppliers to create solutions to mitigate 
challenges to the status of the product or service by regulators. 
These three factors explain a great deal of variation in the governance 
of global wealth chains, as well as reasons for differences in function 
and institutional form. They also encourage us to view wealth chains as 
constituting not only clients and suppliers but also regulators. 
Figure 2, below, provides a series of illustrations on information 
asymmetries between Suppliers, Clients, and Regulators in the 
governance of global wealth chains. The length of the line between the 
three different points represents how opaque information is between 
these actors. Information asymmetry provides a source of innovation 
and protection from regulation.  
For the Market, Figure 2(a), an example is a standard ‘off the shelf’ 
offshore shell company established in the Cayman Islands. The Client 
and Supplier both have a good understanding of what is being 
provided by the product and required information about both parties 
(in many cases the Supplier has very little information who the client 
actually is, see Findley, Nielson, and Sharman, 2013). The key 
information asymmetry here is between the Client and the Regulator. 
The distance between the Supplier and the Regulator is less than that 
between the Client and the Regulator because that is the main point of 
such tax evasion operations - to hide the real identity of the client. As 
such the supplier acts as a buffer between the client and regulator, as 
condoned by international law that permits pervasive offshore activity. 
The main way of being discovered within this system is via a 
whistleblower that has a list of clients. However, a change in contract 
conditions to relocate assets permits the supplier to mitigate 
challenges.  
Information asymmetries are less in the Modular form, Figure 2(b), 
because this is an active regulated market with clear anti-money 
laundering legislation and reporting requirements on the source of 
income. This is, in part, because Modular forms of wealth chains are 
more popular, as with expatriate communities, and easier to trace. For 
example, an expatriate who holds a HSBC offshore account can use this 
product to avoid taxes but there is quite a lot of information known 
between this Client, the Supplier (HSBC), and the Regulator, be they 
the authorities in the offshore jurisdiction or in the country where the 
Client is resident. Given the lack of information asymmetries here the 
lack of forward moving regulation on these wealth chains comes from a 
lack of political will rather than from capacity, although there has 
recently been a lot of momentum from US authorities to plug some of 
the fiscal leaks created by Modular wealth chains (Palan and Wigan 
2014). 
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Figure 2: Information Asymmetries in the Governance of Global Wealth Chains 
 
                          S = Supplier          C = Client     R = Regulator 
 
 
In Relational wealth chains, depicted in Figure 2(c), the greatest 
information asymmetry is between the Supplier and the Client, since 
the point of the relationship between the Supplier and the Client is to 
ensure that Client assets cannot be touched by the Regulator, even if 
the Client comes under scrutiny. A good example here is the surgeon 
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who has an Asset Protection Trust in the Cook Islands, to ensure that if 
he is sued or a divorce occurs then assets cannot be taken by the 
Regulator, even when the Regulator has some information.  
The Captive form, Figure 2(d), shows greater information 
asymmetries than in the Modular form but also less than in the other 
forms. This is again a function of the size and scale of activity that is 
linked back to domestic jurisdictions where Regulators can attempt to 
keep an eye on what is going on. An example here is the relationship 
between Ernst and Young (the Supplier) and a firm (the Client) over the 
best strategies to avoid and minimize corporate taxes. Regulators have 
clear information on how this takes place and the likely revenue lost, 
and the Client and Supplier have clear lines of communication to share 
information on their needs. The Regulator is a bit more distant from the 
Client than the Supplier, since a large part of the service provided by 
the Supplier is to provide professional and legal reasons to Regulators 
for the Client’s activities. 
Finally, the Hierarchy form, Figure 2(e), shows a short distance and 
low information asymmetries between the Supplier and the Client 
while clear and significant information asymmetries between the Client 
and the Regulator and the Supplier and the Regulator. A key reason 
here is that relations between the Client and Supplier are often ‘in 
house’, reducing information asymmetries. Their collective dominant 
position in the market means that the pace of financial and legal 
innovation can increase, which is assisted by superior information 
sharing. This innovation seeks to obscure information going to the 
Regulator. An example here is Apple’s fiscal model, or structured 
finance solutions provided by Barclays oy hedge fund clients. We 
provide details on both below. 
 
These five global wealth chain types and the three variables that 
determine the form of information asymmetries between client, 
suppliers, and regulators are listed below in Table 1, above. We may 
note here that only the Modular form of governance has a low 
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capabilities in being able to mitigate uncertainty, and also that this 
type and the Captive type are the only forms of governance where 
regulatory liability is high. This can be explained by a strong regulatory 
focus on large institutions that can be monitored, or attempt to be 
monitored, compared to the Market and Relational types that can rely 
on contracts as the key form of completing transactions without going 
through traditional financial intermediaries, while those in the 
Hierarchy form are able to provide comprehensive scheme that mix 
conventional and shadow banking with products and services in 
offshore jurisdictions to minimize tax exposures. 
We also note that the degree of explicit coordination increases are 
we move down the right hand side column in the table. Ordering a shell 
company can be done online without unnecessary fuss. Buying large 
denomination bills is simpler. Clients engaging in modular forms of 
governance will only receive a private banker who can assist them with 
international taxation issues once they have invested £250,000. 
Family dealing with trustee and estate planners or asset protection 
trusts have more significant sums to pay for highly customized 
services. Clients and suppliers in captive markets engage in a range of 
complex transactions to create wealth chains and rely heavily on 
professionals and experts from firms such as KPMG, Ernst and Young 
and the like. These professionals have a strong interest in maintaining 
their expert community by limiting the terms of debate over what can 
be governed (Seabrooke and Tsingou 2014), and activist challenges to 
them are forced to address them on their own terms (Seabrooke and 
Wigan 2013). Those engaged in the Hierarchy form have extremely 
complex systems of governance to ensure that transfer pricing and tax 
avoidance and evasion cannot be sufficiently traced by regulators. 
 
 The Future Research Agenda 
As noted above we see the five types not as silos but often mixed in the 
articulation of wealth chains. Interactions may occur across wealth 
chain types and suppliers may switch, under regulatory or competitive 
pressure, from one chain to another. A brief examination of some of the 
various wealth chains now in operation serves to illustrate the potential 
traction of our framework and the salience of the dynamics we identify 
as conditioning elements.  
A Hierarchy-Relational Global Wealth Chain 
Apple Inc. has attracted sustained attention about its global assembly 
and tax planning activities. In May 2013, for instance, following 
investigations into Microsoft and Hewlett Packard, the US Senate’s 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations conducted formal hearings 
into Apple’s global tax planning which was alleged to enable the firm 
to reduce US taxes by $10 billion a year. For instance, in 2011 under a 
‘cost sharing agreement’ (CSA) with a subsidiary in Ireland, Apple was 
able to route approximately $22 billion (or 64% of global pre-tax 
profits) into its Irish holding company (by way of comparison its Irish 
operations employs 4% of its global workforce and accounts for about 
1% of its worldwide sales). The effective tax rate on Apple’s 
international earnings was 2.5%, and estimates of lost tax revenue 
range considerably, with some suggesting $100 billion. The hearings 
found that Apple’s global activities were being arranged in ways that 
not only affected the U.S. Treasury, but many other tax jurisdictions. 
Only 6% of Apple’s pre-tax global income is allocated to jurisdictions 
other than Ireland and the U.S. (U.S. PSI 2013). 
Apple’s multi-jurisdictional tax planning activities constitute an 
hierarchical global wealth chain. Here products are made either in-
house or in close relationships between supplier and client. The ability 
to gain regulatory traction on these chains is severely circumscribed by 
product complexity, flexibility via the iterative re-design of products 
and low information asymmetry between client and supplier. Levels of 
coordination are high. We suggest that regulatory liability is lowest in 
these chains as the high levels of capacity between the supplier and 
client ensure regulators and revenue authorities are in a constant game 
of cat and mouse. Apple Operations International (AOI) and Apple 
Sales International (ASI) take economic ownership of a large share of 
Apple’s IP via a cost and revenue sharing arrangement (CSA), wherein 
for a contribution towards the development of IP the purchaser gains 
economic rights accruing to the revenue accruing to that ownership 
worldwide. Even if the price paid to the parent is ‘correct’ a CSA, as 
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opposed to a licensing agreement, transfers the economic rights to the 
IP to Ireland. A licensing agreement on the other hand means that the 
IP investment and return on investment remain in the U.S. (Sullivan 
2013). Richard Harvey, former senior adviser to the U.S. Inland 
Revenue Service, explained in his testimony to the Apple hearing; 
‘Even if the payment from the tax haven affiliate to the U.S. parent is at 
true fair market value for the intangible assets transferred, ... the U.S. 
parent has effectively shifted income to the tax haven affiliate by virtue 
of the equity contribution’ (Harvey 2013). 
Apple established AOI in Ireland to act as a group holding company 
as early as 1980. At the time, Apple also conducted significant 
manufacturing activity in Ireland. What is especially noteworthy about 
that subsidiary company, however, is that to date AOI has not declared 
tax residency in any jurisdiction. Thus despite an income estimated at 
about $30 billion in the 3 years between 2009 and 2012, AOI filed no 
corporate income tax returns and paid no taxes. AOI, the first amongst 
many offshore affiliates, is able to take advantage of the fact that 
Ireland establishes tax residency on the basis of the location of 
management and control while the U.S. bases determination of tax 
residency on place of incorporation. Hence, much like Google, AOI by 
virtue of the arbitrage offered by different juridical bases of tax and 
corporate nationality is effectively not tax resident anywhere. For the 
U.S., AOI is Irish, for Ireland it is a U.S. entity. In this way, AOI operates 
in the spread between these different national jurisdictions, and 
arbitrages that spread. Such complex corporate structures pose the 
challenge to regulators of a complete overhaul of, or more accurately, 
the invention of accounting, tax and legal rules which are multi-
jurisdictional and offer universal purchase. Without such intervention 
the capacity of the client-supplier will ensure this type of hierarchical 
chain outruns piecemeal interventions. 
A second type of hierarchical chains shares many of these features, 
but in this case the chains also shares some characteristics of relational 
chains.  Financial derivatives can be designed so as to alter where, 
when and what definitional basis a tax charge is levied or tax credit 
afforded (Donohue 2012; Wigan 2013). A recent hearing in the US 
Senate investigated how two global banks, Barclays Bank PLC and 
Deutsche Bank AG, supplied tax efficient (and leverage enhancing) 
trading vehicles to hedge fund clients. Here, for instance, Barclays sold 
basket options products to the hedge fund Renaissance Technologies 
LLC which converted short term capital gains (subject to up to 39% tax 
in the US) to long term capital gains (now subject to 20% tax in the US). 
Simply the hedge fund maintained a trading account at Barclays where 
barclays owned the assets and conducted the hedge fund’s trading 
strategies involving many thousands of short term positions. The 
basket options account, also formally owned by Barclays, was used to 
conduct option trades which mirrored the trades in the brokerage 
account. Effectively, the hedge fund by buying an option on the basket 
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account was able to buy an option from Barclays on its own trading. To 
maintain equivalence between the brokerage and basket options 
account would require extremely close coordination between supplier 
and client, with little gap between them. The bank appointed a hedge 
fund partner to act as investment advisor to the trading account. In 
effect, this is the hedge fund inside the bank. The structure allowed the 
hedge fund to claim tax due at the point at which the option on the 
basket was exercised. So long the option was exercised more than 12 
months after its inception, the hedge fund was able to claim that the 
profits came from exercising the option rather than the underlying 
trades and pay the reduced long term capital gains tax (U.S. PSI 2014). 
A Modular-Captive Global Wealth Chain 
 A different kind of global wealth chain is seen in the growing market 
for expatriate ‘Expat’ international banking. This wealth chain uses 
both the modular and captive types of wealth chains described above. 
The targeted population are expatriate ‘mass affluents’, those who can 
move between domestic fiscal jurisdictions and who can avoid higher 
tax burdens through the use of offshore services provided by large 
international banks offering services via what we identify as a modular 
global wealth chains. This population is wealthy enough for financial 
institutions to be encouraged to help them minimize tax liabilities, but 
not sufficiently wealthy to enlist, or afford, their own autonomous 
trustees and wealth managers (see Harrington 2012). Instead the 
expatriate mass affluent choose different forms of offshore products via 
a bespoke financial institution that offers these choices and has the 
economies of scope and scale due to relationships with larger financial 
institutions. The presentation of Expat banking by large international 
banks, such as HSBC and Lloyds, assures clients that offshore banking 
is not illegal or dishonest and provides significant tax advantages. The 
wealth chain is articulated by hosting client’s capital in a subsidiary in 
an offshore jurisdiction, with access to the capital controlled by the 
subsidiary and parent institutions, and with the client having 
information and access via internet technologies. For example, HSBC 
Expat’s operations are organized primarily through Jersey, which is 
promoted to clients as a stable regulatory jurisdiction that works in 
close cooperation with the UK Financial Conduct Authority and 
conforms with OECD standards on international tax agreements 
(www.expat.hsbc.com).  
This wealth chain is primarily modular because what clients have 
access to depends on what they are investing, with a clearly 
demarcated decision-tree in operation for the large international 
operating in this market. For example, a client with Lloyds Bank with 
less than £25,000-£49,000 to invest will be offered multi-currency 
banking and internet and phone banking. Clients with £50,000 to 
£249,000 are offered ‘premier’ services with a call from a Premier 
Relationship Manager and potential to meet with International 
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Financial Managers to discuss investment strategies. Those with more 
than £250,000 to invest are provided with private banking services and 
a Private Banking Relationship Manager with a direct phone line and 
email access. Premier and private banking clients also have access to 
an International Tax Service who are tasked with ‘ensuring you don’t 
pay more tax than you should’ (international.lloydsbank.com).  
This is where the global wealth chain also reflects a captive type, 
since the international tax services are provided by one of the Big Four 
professional accountancy firms. In the case of Lloyds the client is 
placed in a relationship with Ernst & Young, who assist the client in 
minimizing their tax exposure. Importantly, the Big Four provide an 
excellent example of the captive type of global wealth chain. 
Institutional change and reform within this ‘mature organizational 
field’ is particularly difficult, since there is a high degree of consensus 
from the professionals involved on the appropriate technologies and 
standards for governing financial transactions (Suddaby, Cooper and 
Greenwood, 2007). Innovation within this captive type is through 
international professional interaction, and that is offered to clients is 
limited by consensus among the Big Four, the ‘lead suppliers’. As such, 
Expat banking provides an example of how capital moves from clients 
to an offshore jurisdiction, with the client assessed for what services 
are appropriate, depending on their investment, and then referred to 
the tax management giants. Expat banking provides an example of the 
combination of modular and captive types of global wealth chains.  
A Market-Relational Global Wealth Chain 
Market chains involve the simplest and most easily accessed products. 
Cash, in the form of the big bill is the clearest example, ensuring 
client’s operating illicit wealth chains security, anonymity and an 
effective means of exchange and store of value. Regulatory attention is 
channeled through a flawed anti-money laundering regime (Tsingou 
2010) to focus on second tier suppliers. The irony in the case of big 
bills is that the state in the form of central banks and Treasuries are the 
first tier suppliers, with banking institutions delivering the product to 
the ultimate clients. The key bills here are the American $100 bill, the 
€200 and €500 notes, and the 1000 Swiss franc note. Notably, the big 
Euro bills were introduced by the ECB in 2002 in what seems to be a 
competitive strategy to gain access to the seigniorage then enjoyed 
almost exclusively by the U.S. and Switzerland (Henry 2014). 
Regulatory liability here is even lower than for off the shelf shell 
companies with costs of switching between suppliers and costs of 
entrance minimal. Since states are the first tier supplier here, an 
absence of decisive intervention must be a function of weak political 
will. In other market wealth chains regulatory interventions have 
created new opportunities of offshore financial service provision and 
catalyzed shift between chain types.  
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In the case of Liechtenstein, regulatory initiatives in the form the 
2003 EU Savings Tax Directive prompted a shift from a relational to a 
market chain, while more recent interventions have prompted offshore 
business in the jurisdiction to return to a more relational model 
(Sharman 2014). The Savings Tax Directive demands EU member states 
and European tax havens either supply information on non-resident EU 
citizen bank interest income or apply a withholding tax to that income. 
That the Directive did not track accounts held by trusts or corporate 
entities generated a flood of business in Liechtenstein, particularly 
from Switzerland, as clients converted personal bank accounts to 
accounts held by trusts or Liechtenstein Anstalts. This conversion is a 
simple matter of signing a contract. Trusts and Anstalts can be mass-
produced to demand. Regulatory traction on this process is low as the 
provider need not know client identity, as much as the client need not 
know the provider. Pressure from the G20 in 2009 and the fallout from 
the Kieber leak where an employee of LGT Bank sold client information 
to the German government lead to the shift back to the more relational 
form led by the Liechtenstein government. In agreement with the UK, 
Liechtenstein established the Liechtenstein Disclosure Facility which 
allowed those owing tax to the UK and with assets in Liechtenstein to 
declare this wealth for a much a reduced penalty. In result, funds have 
flowed back into Liechtenstein bank accounts from account holders in 
a range of offshore jurisdictions. Significantly, account holders must 
establish a lasting relationship with the bank allowing the bank to sell 
a range of auxiliary services.  
 
  
 Conclusion 
In closing, our aim in this paper is to provide an original theoretical 
framework for understanding how global wealth chains are governed. 
We argue that an analysis of global wealth chains is essential for 
understanding the integration of production and finance. As suggested 
above, global wealth chains are the yin to the yang of global value 
chains. Many value chains, which do have the potential to reduce 
information asymmetries and enhance development, exist alongside 
wealth chains, which operate multi-jurisdictionally to protect and 
create wealth, often through opaque structures and secrecy. Here we 
argue that global wealth chains can be understood by the complexity of 
transactions, the regulatory liability implied, and the capacities of 
suppliers to provide certain kinds of financial instruments. We have 
outlined how global wealth chains can be seen in five types: market, 
modular, relational, captive, and hierarchy. These types are often 
mixed as firms, groups, and individuals engage in innovative forms of 
multi-jurisdictional wealth protection and creation. Future research 
can use these types to investigate and reflect on how global wealth 
chains are articulated, including locating what kinds of actors and 
organizations are involved and what kind of processes permit their 
existence. Finally, we suggest that analyses of global wealth chains are 
essential for understanding not only how finance is changing but core 
changes in finance and production in modern capitalism. 
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